Section 203 Lets Authors End Decades-Old Grants Within a Five-Year Statutory Window

U.S. copyright law lets some authors take back rights they have assigned or licensed to others, even after a deal has run for decades. The mechanism is called termination of transfers, and it is set out in section 203 of Title 17 of the U.S. Code. The statute sets when a grant can end and what notice has to be given before it does.

The U.S. Copyright Office publishes its own guidance on the section, and the statute text sets the core timing. This explainer draws on both sources. It also covers a 2026 federal appeals ruling on a related provision, section 304(c), which concerns rights outside the United States.

Which Grants Section 203 Reaches

Section 203 applies only to grants that an author executed on or after January 1, 1978. Subsection (a) covers only works other than works made for hire, so a work produced under a work-for-hire arrangement falls outside it, according to the Cornell Legal Information Institute’s text of the statute.

Under the section, an author can end a transfer or license the author granted. The Copyright Office’s page on the section says that if the author is not living, the right passes to the author’s surviving spouse, children or grandchildren. Executors, administrators, personal representatives or trustees may also act.

The rule therefore reaches a grant only where an author made it and the work is not a work made for hire. Readers checking a contract should first establish both facts: the date of signing and whether the work was made for hire.

The Termination Window
Under 17 U.S.C. § 203, the termination window lasts five years and normally opens 35 years after the grant was executed, according to the Cornell Legal Information Institute.

The Five-Year Window and Its Start Dates

A termination may take effect during a five-year window. The window normally opens 35 years after the grant was executed. Where the grant covers the right of publication, the window opens at the earlier of 35 years after publication or 40 years after execution, according to Cornell’s text of the statute.

The Copyright Office gives the same starting points. It says a termination cannot take effect until 35 years after the grant was executed. For publication grants, the effective date cannot come earlier than 40 years after execution or 35 years after publication, whichever comes first.

Whether a grant covers publication therefore changes which date starts the clock. The two sources describe the same rule, so the practical question for a given grant is its execution date and, where relevant, its publication date.

As simple arithmetic, a normal grant signed in 1978 would see its window open in 2013 and run for five years, to 2018.

Serving Notice and Recording It

The author or the heirs must serve a written notice on the grantee or the grantee’s successor in title. The notice must state an effective date that falls inside the window. It must be served not less than two and not more than ten years before that date, according to Cornell.

The Copyright Office describes an earlier point for service. It says a notice may be served no earlier than 25 years after the grant was executed. For publication grants, the earliest service date is 30 years after execution or 25 years after publication, whichever comes first. Taken with the 35-year start, the 25-year figure sits ten years before the window opens.

The form, content and manner of service follow a regulation issued by the Register of Copyrights. The Office says the proposed regulation was based on the existing regulation for termination under section 304.

The notice must also be recorded with the Copyright Office before the effective date. Cornell’s text makes recordation a condition for the termination to take effect, so a notice that is served but not recorded in time does not end the grant.

The Office’s timeline shows when the process became available. Because of the 25-year rule, the first date any section 203 notice could be served was January 1, 2003. A proposed regulation was issued December 20, 2002. An interim regulation was published December 23, 2002, effective January 1, 2003. The final rule was published April 8, 2003, and took effect May 8, 2003.

Who Can Serve Notice and Whether Agreements Can Override It

Under Cornell’s summary of the statute, the notice must be signed by the required number and proportion of owners of termination interests, or by their duly authorized agents. For a joint work, a majority of the authors who executed the grant may do so.

Where an author is dead, the termination interest is owned as follows. A surviving widow or widower takes the whole interest unless there are surviving children or grandchildren, in which case the spouse takes half. Surviving children, and the surviving children of any dead child, own the entire interest unless there is a widow or widower, in which case they divide one-half between them.

Children and grandchildren share by family line. A deceased child’s share can be exercised only by a majority of that child’s children. An executor, administrator, personal representative or trustee takes the whole interest only if no widow, widower, child or grandchild survives.

The statute also states that termination may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. Cornell’s summary says the wording covers an agreement to make a will or a future grant. A clause in the original grant therefore does not, on the statute’s wording, stop the termination.

The window normally opens 35 years after the grant was executed.

What Changes When a Termination Takes Effect

On the effective date, the rights covered by the terminated grant revert to the owners of termination interests. This includes owners who did not sign the notice. Cornell’s summary says the reverted rights vest on the date the notice is served.

Further grants of the reverted rights need the same number and proportion of owners as were needed to terminate. A further grant is valid only if made after the effective date. An exception allows an agreement for such a further grant to be made with the original grantee once the notice of termination has been served.

Derivative works prepared under the grant before termination may continue to be used on the grant’s terms. The statute does not permit new derivative works to be prepared on the basis of the work after termination.

Termination affects only rights arising under Title 17. It does not affect rights under other federal, state or foreign laws, according to Cornell’s text. Where a grant does not provide otherwise, it continues for the term of copyright unless terminated under the section.

A 2026 Fifth Circuit Ruling on a Related Provision

Section 304(c) is the statutory termination provision of the 1976 Copyright Act, and it governs termination of earlier grants and the renewal rights that come with them. Loeb & Loeb’s summary says the panel focused on that provision.

On January 12, 2026, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a Louisiana federal court’s declaration that Cyril Vetter is the sole worldwide owner of the copyright in ‘Double Shot (Of My Baby’s Love).’ The song was co-written in 1962 by Vetter and Don Smith and assigned to Windsong Music Publishers. Vetter’s company, Vetter Communications, bought the Smith heirs’ interest in the song.

Resnik, the defendant, appealed. The panel focused on the subsection stating that termination affects only rights arising under the title. Under the summary, the panel held that termination of the grant and the contingent renewal rights apply worldwide, not only in the United States.

The panel rejected the argument that the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions bar worldwide termination. It reasoned that national treatment requires members to recognize rights granted under another member’s law, so a U.S.-law copyright can be recognized globally. It also found no territorial violation, because the case concerns ownership, assignment and termination rather than infringement abroad.

The panel relied on Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons for a non-geographic reading of the ‘under this title’ language. It also noted that the 1909 Act’s renewal provision ‘makes no mention of geographical limitations to the scope of renewal rights.’

The panel declined to follow the Second and Ninth Circuits, which held that termination affects only U.S. rights. It described their support as weak and nonbinding, because it rested on treatises focused on infringement rather than on ownership, assignment and termination.

Whether the ruling has been reheard or taken up by the Supreme Court has not been announced in the sources used for this article.